II
Overture of Chaos in
A. Power Dynamics
a.
For many
centuries, most or all of the
During
Armed resistance against German-Italian fascism and their associates began immediately. A group known as Chetniks, led by Colonel Draza Mihailovic and other Serb officers and soldiers, recaptured the forests and mountains, and began fighting against the troops of the German occupation.
Josip Broz Tito, the Croat head of the Yugoslav Communist Party, organized a rival, pan-Yugoslav resistance group called the Partisans, in 1941. The Chetniks and the Partisans soon moved from loose and fairly random cooperation to open conflict. While the Chetniks continued to be an almost exclusively Serb and poorly organized force, the Partisans, using slogans such as "death to fascism, freedom to the people" and "brotherhood and unity," recruited fighters and supporters from all of the Yugoslav ethnic groups.[1] In the end, the Partisans became the group that played the predominant role in defeating the occupying power, mainly because of their broad appeal, better organization and discipline, and greater persistence in fighting their Axis enemies.
In 1945, Tito, as premier, established
Under Tito, the
founder and leader of the Partisans,
Tito broke with
the
Following Titofs death in 1980, years of economic crisis and growing political and ethnic conflicts led to the federationfs disintegration in 1991 and 1992.
b. The Diversity of
The population
of
The primary difference
that distinguished
c. Death of Tito and the
Corruption of
Before
In 1980, the
year Tito died, a worldwide recession and foreign credit squeeze caused a
crisis in
Between April
and December 1990, Communist regimes collapsed throughout
Chaotic
negotiations among the post-Communist republic leaders from December 1990 to
June 1991 failed to produce a new formula to preserve some kind of
d. Flow of Capital and
Changing Perception
In the world of free-market economics, there is no merit in keeping the country together since poor areas cannot share the capital with richer ones. Furthermore, serious economic depression and hyper-inflation, which was 2665% annually in 1989, propelled movements for independence.[6] (see Appendix Y-2) Croatia also had a long historical feud with Serbs. Furthermore, in Slovenia, 87.6% of the total population is Slovenian, so compared with other areas in Yugoslavia it was not very mixed and its people felt compelled to declare the regionfs independence.
After the death of Tito, there was no person who possessed strong charisma to connect this multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious country. (See Appendix Y-1) Under Socialism, people do not care about differences in religion, since the system of socialism itself does not care about diversity. However, some nationalistic politicians stirred the peoplefs lust for nationalism under the regime of free-market economy, and used this nationalism to fortify their own politically firm positions inside the nation. This thoughtless idea to use nationalism as a tool to control the nation caused political turmoil. This phenomenon was especially conspicuous in Serbia.
e. Emergence of Nationalism
in Slovenia and
Map of former Yugoslavia[7]
The first area that held free elections was the Republic of Slovenia, which decided to be independent from former Yugoslavia with support of 94.7% of their population in a referendum held in December 1990. The Republic of Croatia also created a new constitution that declared the right to independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These two countries tried to change the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from a federation to a union of the independent states. However, the Republic of Serbia accused this movement of divisionism. The Yugoslav army made an unsuccessful effort to stop Sloveniafs secession. Meanwhile, in Croatia a war immediately erupted.@The Croatian Serb militias joined the Yugoslav army, and fought against rapidly armed Croatian forces. The war lasted until December 1991. A United Nations representative negotiated a cease-fire, leaving nearly one-third of Croatia under Serb control in a self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina until 1995. Because of these tensions, Bosnia and Macedonia made a compromise plan to create the partnership of the independent states.[8]
f. Independence of Croatia
and the Role of
In 1990 Franjo Tudjman, the founder of the nationalist party Croatian Democratic Union, became president of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia. Tudjman had been imprisoned for his support of Croatian nationalism in the 1970s and again in the early 1980s. After his election as president, relations between the new regime and the republicfs Serb minority rapidly deteriorated. The government started to remove Serbs from jobs in the Croatian police, state bureaucracy, and state-owned companies. Serbs were alarmed by the reintroduction of historic Croatian symbols that had also been used by the Ustashe, a fascist organization that had run Croatia as an Axis puppet state during World War II.[9]
The story of Yugoslaviafs disintegration and war started from the recognition of the independence of Croatia by Germany in 1990. In 1990, there was euphoria in Germany because of the countryfs unification and West Germanyfs victory in the FIFA World Cup tournament. In this euphoria, Germany could not make a rational decision. There was also historical sympathy between Germany and Croatia, which mainly comes from the influence of Roman Catholicism in Bavaria, the relationship between Germany and Ustashe, and the fact that two-thirds of Yugoslavian immigrants in Germany are Croatian. Also there is a historical antipathy toward Serbia in Germany, which comes historical events such as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, and the Partisan resistance against Germany by Tito in World War II.
Such historical background informed the decision of German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. As a result, the national television station in Croatia broadcast the song gDanke Deutschlandh on January 15, 1992, to show Croatiafs appreciation. However, the Serbian national television station broadcast this song repeatedly showing images of the entrance of Hitlerfs military into Zagreb during World War II.[10]
All other European Community countries refused recognition of Croatiafs independence, since this decision might cause an uprising of nationalism in Yugoslavia, which was feared would destroy Yugoslavia itself. Furthermore, it would stimulate the nationalism of surrounding countries such as Turkey, Greece and Albania. French President Francois Mitterrand in particular clarified his position as supporting the federation of Yugoslavia, and criticized Germany implicitly.
g. International
Recognition of the Independence of
Because of Germanyfs one-sided decision, the authority of the Badlander Committee, which was established to judge whether these countries had met the standards to be recognized as nations, was destroyed. On January 15, 1992, the Badlander Committee announced that Slovenia and Macedonia were sufficiently independent to be recognized as nations, but not Croatia and Bosnia. Nevertheless, Greece was also strongly opposed to admit the independence of Macedonia, so in the end, only Slovenia and Croatia were admitted as nations, but not Bosnia and Macedonia.[11]
h. New Problems in
As a result, tragedy happened. All other areas in Yugoslavia became nationalistic, aspiring to establish new nations defined by ethnic background. Many observers had long regarded Bosnia as the Yugoslav republic where civil war was most likely, and believed that conflict there would be especially bloody if Yugoslavia disintegrated. None of Bosniafs three official ethnic groups—Muslim Slavs, Croats, and Serbs—constituted a majority of the population.
Ethnic Division in Bosnia in 1991 and 1997[12]
Bosnia held its first multiparty elections in the fall of 1990. Three nationalist parties, one for each of the major ethnic groups, garnered 76 percent of the popular vote and 202 of the legislaturefs 240 seats. The Muslim Slavsf Party of Democratic Action, led by Alija Izetbegovic, won 87 seats, which is 34 percent of the legislature. The Serb Democratic Party (SDP), led by Radovan Karadzic a political leader connected to Milosevic in Serbia, took 71 seats, which is 30 percent. The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian branch of Tudjmanfs ruling HDZ in Croatia, won 44 seats, or 18 percent. As a result, Bosnian Muslim nationalist Izetbegovic became the president of Bosnia. The three nationalist parties formed a fragile coalition government, but it fell apart when Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1991.[13]
Ethnic background is extremely complicated in Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia (see Appendix Y-1), and Tito knew that to unite this multiethnic nation, he needed a strategy to beat the racists and the nationalists in Yugoslavia under communism. However, the recognition of Croatiafs independence caused antipathy between religions and nations in other areas in Yugoslavia. This enmity was intensified by politicians who used nationalism for their own ends.
The important thing to note is that the person who sent troops to stop the independence of Slovenia and to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia in 1991 was the prime minister of Yugoslavia, who was Croatian. However, except for this action, there were not too many efforts to keep Yugoslavia a multiethnic nation.
Also, the person who ordered troops to fight a newly independent Croatia was not Milosevic. However, Slavoj Zizek points out that the corruption of Yugoslavia started as early as 1987, when Milosevic revoked a certain amount of autonomy for Kosovo and Vojvodina. Because of this, the delicate balance of Yugoslavia was damaged, and became impossible to recover. Since then, according to Zizek, there were only two realistic ways to exist for Yugoslavia. These are: 1) become Yugoslavia led by Serbia, or 2) shift from a moderate federation to a group of completely independent republics, which would achieve complete decentralization.[14]
i. The Role of the
Initially, the United States did not intend to intervene in Yugoslavia. James Baker, the then Secretary of States, thought that there was no national profit for the United States in Yugoslavia. At that time, the biggest interests for the United States were the situations in Moscow and the Persian Gulf. Baker pointed out that the European Communityfs undertaking the responsibility of Yugoslavia was gcomfortableh for the Bush administration.[15] However, during this time, there was tension between Europe and the United States over the function of NATO. The United States wanted to sustain and enhance the function of NATO, but European countries, especially France, had ambitions to give more force to the Western European Union (WEU) instead of to NATO.
j. New Sparks in
The Bosnian War (March 1992-October 1995) was the extension of the independence wars of Slovenia and Croatia. (see Appendix Y-4) In Bosnia, there were Muslim, Serbs, and Croatians, and Serbs were against the independence of Bosnia. At the beginning of the war, the Serbs predominated and ruled 70% of Bosnia in the first three months, and then Croatians and Muslims started to fight each other in the rest of the country.
Laurence Eagleburger, American Deputy Secretary of State and an expert on Yugoslavia, thought recognizing the independence of Bosnia would prevent a war there. Eagleburger thought it would be possible to avoid the division of Bosnia by Serbia and Croatia. This approach was pretty similar to Hans Dietrich Genscherfs strategy, which said that recognition of Croatiafs independence would avoid war. The important dilemma here lies in the fact that the EC recognized the Bosnian Government in April 1992 under pressure from the United States, in spite of ECfs arbitration.[16]
The
Go Next: B. Changing Perception
[1] Rusinow, Dennison gYugoslaviah Microsoft Encyclopedia
[2] Rusinow, Dennison gYugoslaviah Microsoft Encyclopedia
[3] Tanaka News: gKawaru Yugoslaviah [Changing Yugoslavia] Tanaka News
[4] Rusinow, Dennison gYugoslaviah Microsoft Encyclopedia
[5] Rusinow, Dennison gYugoslaviah Microsoft Encyclopedia
[6] Chida, Zen. Yūgo funsō wa naze chōkika shitaka: Higeki wo ookikusaseta ōbeishokoku no sekinin [Why Yugoslavian War Became Long: The Responsibilities of European Countries and America] p12
[7] On the Issues
[8] Chida, Zen. Yugo funsou ha naze choukika shitaka p15, 16
[9] Rusinow, Dennison. gYugoslav Successionh Microsoft Encyclopedia
[10] Chida, Zen. Yugo funsou ha naze choukika shitaka p51
[11] Chida, Zen. Yugo funsou ha naze cyokika shitaka p 32-50
[12] Microsoft Encyclopedia
[13] Rusinow, Dennison gYugoslav Successionh Microsoft Encyclopedia
[14] Zizek, Slavoj. Translated by Tatsuya Moriyama gAgainst the Double Blackmailh Hihyou Kuukan No.II-24 2000 p75
[15] Chida, Zen. Yūgo funsō wa naze chōkika shitaka p66-67
[16] Chida, Zen. Yūgo funsō wa naze chōkika shitaka p71
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